Proponents of Realpolitik suggest that all that matters, and all that we should concern ourselves with, in international relations, is power. Accurately assessing and managing our power and leveraging it to negotiate among the other powers in the world is an end in itself from which greater American security will flow. Wikipedia's definition is cogent:
Realpolitik (German: real “realistic”, “practical” or “actual”; and Politik “politics”) refers to politics or diplomacy based primarily on practical considerations, rather than ideological notions. The term realpolitik is often used pejoratively to imply politics that are coercive, amoral, or Machiavellian. Realpolitik is a theory of politics that focuses on considerations of power, not ideals, morals, or principles.
Realpolitik was introduced during the Nixon administration under the tutelage of Henry Kissinger. Their approach led to the ending of American attempts to isolate China and the beginning of our diplomatic engagement with Communists of China.
An early read of the Obama administration's approach to the international arena suggests that they are operating under a new, very limited understanding of Realpolitik. In other words, although the Obama administration clearly has some ideological preferences, their interest is much more directed at managing power relationships, as they perceive and define them, than by ideology. Whether their perception of power relationships is accurate and their management of those relationships is effective will go a long way toward determining how well the newly developing international rule set evolves. In important areas, the Obama administration acts as if the Untied States is much weaker than it was perceived to be under the Bush administration.
There are two variants of Realpolitik that are important to understand. One variant, the Tom Barnett version, suggests that the friction we see in the gap and the gap-core interface is an inevitable outcome of modernization and that as the gap becomes better integrated into the core, such friction will diminish and be replaced by more conventional economic competition. Our management of the transition will involve minimizing extreme perturbations of the rule set. In this model, moving toward a more mature relationship with China, in which they become greater stakeholders and enforcers in the international system, is key. In this conception, Iran and its nuclear ambitions is a sideshow. In the most hopeful iteration of this approach, the belief is that once Iran achieves a nuclear capacity, it will follow the path of the USSR and China and slowly moderate as the realization of the impossibility of the use of nuclear weapons for offensive war becomes clear. There are many arguments that can be made about this view but on balance it is a reasonably optimistic point of view and defensible as the basis for a foreign policy.
[For the record, I am in complete agreement on the necessity to manage our relationship with China without falling into the trap of making them our enemy; a large enemy is necessary for a large conventional military, but it would be far wiser to co-opt China as a supporter of the international order, even while competing and finding areas of friction. On the other hand, I believe Tom Barnett seriously underestimates the danger a nuclear armed Iran presents to globalization. There is no way to determine, a priori, who is right in this, but it may well be that if Pakistan descends into chaos we will have the opportunity to observe the impact on globalization of nuclear weapons in the hands of dedicated radical Islamists.]
Thus far, it appears that Obama has only partially adopted Tom Barnett's version of Realpolitik and his view of Realpolitik emphasizes our weaknesses rather than our strengths. The differences are instructive. An Obama Realpolitik treats those who have money, weapons, the will to use their weapons, and minimal responsiveness to American power, as those most in need of managing. This may perfectly reasonable though his choice of technique is questionable.
From the way the news leaks have been propagated, it is clear that the Obama administration is sensitive to the needs and desires of many of the world's worst actors, including the Iranian Mullahs and their allies/dependents, Syria, Hezbollah, Hamas. This could represent a skillful public relations effort designed to convince the Muslim world that the United States understands their need to demonize the West, and especially Israel, while working through (with in the State Department and Pentagon) their understanding of where, if any place, the red line should be drawn with Iran. The alternative is to believe that, like the drunk who loses his keys in the middle of the block but searches for them on the corner because "the light is better there", the Obama administration is leaning on Israel primarily because it feels it can.
[Domestically, there is a growing body of evidence that President Obama is not averse to the exercise of pure power. His behavior in the economic crisis, essentially threatening those who have the temerity to oppose him, is instructive. He has not yet shown much evidence that contract law, among other legal impediments, represent more than incidental hindrances to his achieving his goals. This lends credence to the idea that he may see the Untied States as inhabiting a seriously weakened position because of the behavior of the Bush administration.]
The sad truth of the matter is that there is little that the United States can do to influence the behavior or direction of the Islamic World. However that does not mean that we should be passive; in fact, we are not yet doing what is a prerequisite for Realpolitik to work. The basics of true Realpolitik would include clearly delineating "red lines" across which the United States will not tolerate transgressions. The mutual understanding of the ground rules during the Cold War was an essential part of the MAD stability. At present it does not appear that the Obama administration has yet determined where their red lines are, and the ensuing confusion and perception of weakness thus engendered are strengthening those forces which have minimal confusion or ambiguity. Thus we see the possibility of disaster for Lebanon, the Talibanization of Pakistan, and the further strengthening of the Iranian hard liners in their upcoming elections as likely outcomes of the new Realpolitik of the Obama Presidency.
[Ahmadinejad is currently leading in the polls in Iran. He has conspicuously not been repudiated by the Council of Guardians or the Supreme Leader Ayatollah Khamenie.]
Although it is too early to tell, and we will only really know how Obama will respond when he is actually tested, the early indications are that Obama does not particularly value the military option, does not believe that our military can positively impact events, and is making a virtue out of necessity by extolling dialog with our enemies. He may well be correct in his assessment of our paucity of options, but his sympathetic, willing, and apparenlty eager embrace of our weakness is troubling. As usual, events will be determinative.
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