It always pays to be a pessimist when it comes to the Middle East. The various compelling narratives which fuel the various interested parties are typically incompatible with the competing narratives of their enemies and rivals. And that doesn't even take into account the actual realities of the competing interests. Yet, despite the seemingly intractable nature of the Middle East, there are glimmers of hope that slip out from time to time. Unfortunately, due to the narratives ascribed to by the international elites, the greatest likelihood remains that such hopeful signs will be mismanaged and opportunities will be lost, however, I would be remiss to ignore them nonetheless.
Martin Kramer at MESH helpfully deconstructed the myth that the central conflict of the Middle East is the Palestinian-Israeli conflict and that all other conflicts in that parlous region emerge from and are linked to the Israeli-Palestinian conflict. In The myth of linkage, he lists Nine Clusters of Conflict:
First, the Arab-Persian conflict (with its origins in earlier Ottoman-Persian conflict). ...
Second, the Shiite-Sunni conflict, which goes back in various forms for fourteen centuries, and which the struggle for Iraq has greatly inflamed, both within that country and beyond. ...
Third, the Kurdish awakening, which involves a large national group experiencing a political revival in the territory of several existing states. ...
Fourth, the inter-Arab conflict among Arab states over primacy, influence, and borders—the result of disputes created by the post-Ottoman partition of the Arab lands by Britain and France. ...
Fifth, conflicts over the political aspirations of compact Christian groups with strong historic ties to the West. ...
Sixth, conflicts that arise from the quest of Arab states to preserve or restore parts of their pre-colonial African empires. ...
Seventh, the nationalist-Islamist conflicts within states, which are the result of failed modernization and the disappointed expectations of independence. ...
Eighth, numerous conflicts, centered in the Persian Gulf, generated by the addiction of the industrialized West to the vast oil resources of the region, and the need of the United States to maintain its hegemony over the world’s single largest reservoir of energy. ...
Ninth, there is conflict involving Israel, on three planes: Arab-Israeli (that is, Israel versus Arab states), Palestinian-Israeli, and Iranian-Israeli. ...
It is a long article and Martin Kramer illuminates and elucidates the issues quite clearly. It is not inconsequential that most of these conflicts have nothing to do with Israel or the Palestinians. Richard Fernandez, in his comment on Kramer's post, notes that the insistence on placing the Israeli-Palestinian dispute at the center and linking all other disputes to it, serves primarily a political function:
Kramer may well be right; and diplomats may be missing opportunity after opportunity in the Middle East because of slavish adherence to a "linkage" model that is largely illusory. But irrational approaches seldom survive for many decades without some underlying logic. There is probably a reason for the popularity of the "linkage" theory that posits Israel as the cause of every disturbance in the region. The obvious candidate is politics. The "linkage" theory retains its currency because it is good politics and not because it has any utility in fixing the problems in the Middle East.
If the Israeli-Palestinian conflict, which is famously intractable and which features irreconcilable differences, is fueled by anti-Semitism, nurtured by hatreds lovingly taught, and maintained by politics, where is there any room for optimism? Several points come to mind.
First, Iran is becoming an increasingly tumultuous place. The pressures of rising gas prices (Iran must import all of their gasoline), a failing economy, and increasing competition between Iranian power centers, means that those whose primary goal is to survive and thrive materially may gain the edge over those whose apocalyptic religious ideology thrives on externalized chaos. In other words, Iran may yet develop a ruling class governed by rational self-interest, in which case, it can be dealt with.
At the same time, the fear of an emboldened Shia led axis of intolerance seeking hegemony over its neighbors, may yet force the traditional Jew haters of Saudi Arabia into a de facto alliance with Israel and keep them in the American led camp, which values stability above all ( in order to keep the pumps working and the oil flowing.)
The fear of a meddlesome and murderous Iran may also be an important force behind an overt ongoing alliance with America and Iraq and a covert alliance between Israel and Iraq, who will share a similar national interest, ie to manage and minimize the HISH alliances ability to create havoc.
More speculatively, developments in Iran could well foreshadow changes in a more moderate direction. If the economy continues to fail, the moderates (who are not terribly moderate, but appear to at least not be irrational) may yet be able to outmaneuver the fanatics and gain some headway into turning Iran into a more normal nation.
Again, optimism is almost never rewarded in the Middle East, yet the outlines of a more stable and slightly less chaotic structure in the Middle East, with shifting groups of rivals who compete but stop short of war is possible.
The wild cards in the mix suggest where the real linkage lies, both actual and potential. Any progress would be derailed if Iran gets the bomb. Nearly every one of the clusters of conflict Martin Kramer delineates becomes exponentially more dangerous and exponentially more difficult to resolve, once Iran has the bomb. The Middle East will become a far more dangerous place and when the Middle East destabilizes, the entire international system, such as it is, is threatened.
The key for the rest of the Bush presidency and likely for th next President, will be to convince Iran, Russia, China, the EU, et al, that we are serious about stopping Iran. Only the threat of military action can both minimize the risk of military action becoming necessary and maximize the possibility of Iran indefinitely post-poning their quest for a bomb. Managing such a difficult feta may well be beyond the reach of the current President, is likely beyond the reach of John McCain, and does not even appear to be on the horizon of Barack Obama. A betting man would put money on Iran obtaining the bomb (though their own foibles could yet preclude their success) but on rare occasions the human race does manage to avoid the worst case scenarios; perhaps this can be one of those times.
Recent Comments