Towards a Grand Strategy for an Uncertain World is meant to be a prescription for how the Western democracies and like minded nations can develop a new strategic vision and new structures to deal with the increasing uncertainty and complexity of the modern world. It is a deeply depressing document, not least because of its measured and realistic tone and content. The document notes that in our highly interconnected world, there are no longer "local" problems; all problems are potentially global: (page 66)
As we have indicated, trends, risks, dangers and specific threats cannot be seen in isolation from each other. Because there are fewer geographical limitations to a problem, a viable risk assessment must be global. It is necessary to appreciate the interlinking complexity of the present challenges and their potentially huge scale. It is a hallmark of the globalised world that threats are multi-faceted and multi-directional. We have to formulate a strategic response that matches the complexities we face.
War never was the application of military force alone. But today, non-military means have a more prominent role to play than ever before. In addition to conventional military and nuclear balances of power, asymmetric threats will be used more frequently. States or non-state actors may well start conflicts by proxy, by abusing their leverage in energy resources, or through the financial ‘weapon’. There exists a great – and unprecedented – danger that multiple players could wage war on the West by deploying these various instruments simultaneously.
However, there are two interconnected problems with developing systemic responses robust enough to deal with the complexity. The first problem is that there are no structures in place that can effectively deal with the modern world's problems. NATO comes closest but as pointed out by the authors, NATO is undermanned, underfunded, and suffers from its own problem of action by committee, ie "NATO action" is increasingly becoming an oxymoron for reasons of confused and conflicted leadership, lack of political will, and lack of military capabilities: (page 78)
Overall, NATO will remain of central importance for the future of the transatlantic alliance, and will be the point of departure for the strategy we will describe in the next chapters. But in its political and military structure, decision-making mechanisms and military capabilities, NATO still greatly reflects the needs of the Cold War, a dangerous period but one of relative stability – a stability and a period of the rule of international law that, considering past centuries, may well have been a historical anomaly and cannot be taken for granted today. The present fragility of the international systems can be a very unnerving realisation, especially for European nations.
The other part of the problem is that NATO nations remain democracies that must respond to the will of the people. If the people do not even recognize a problem and see no threat for which to sacrifice, there can be no political will to invest the requisite resources for a long, sustained struggle. Unfortunately, there is too large a segment of the population that simply does not see, or refuses to see, the threat: (page 78)
The globalising world and its globalised threats and challenges, as discussed in Chapter 1, first require awareness – itself an act of intellectual and political courage – and the will to accept challenges and act on them. Both public awareness and political resolve have been very weak, and so the translation of this overall picture into future security policies is precluded.
It is untenable that we are willing to pay more for security on flight tickets, and yet are unwilling to take care of security as a whole. In cases where these freedoms are abused in order to undermine them, there is a lack of will to defend them – and indeed a failure to appreciate what the West stands for. Ultimately, such will originates from within the nation state, rather than being imposed by any international organisation. If the West forgets what it stands for, then it becomes hard to discern what it is that Western nations have to offer the world.
Western nations ought to take greater pride in their values of the rule of law, democracy, individual liberty, freedom of speech and the freedom of religion. The report makes clear that in order to sustain the struggle for the West against the long term interconnected threats, tremendous investments must be made in order to enhance our ability to fight on many fronts simultaneously. The fighting will only on occasion be kinetic, but only a robust military and the will to use it will diminish the necessity for kinetic warfare. This is a point the pacifist left has never grasped.
The United States, British, and Australian militarizes cannot do it by themselves. Further, if a President enters office effectively announcing his/her intention to renounce the use of force, as in a declaration of retreat form a key theater in the war, our military capabilities and will to use them will have been dramatically weakened. This leads to the authors' most troubling remarks: (page 95)
Simultaneously observing proportionality and damage limitation will become extremely difficult in cases where the use of nuclear weapons must be considered. The first use of nuclear weapons must remain in the quiver of escalation as the ultimate instrument to prevent the use of weapons of mass destruction, in order to avoid truly existential dangers. [Emphasis mine-SW]
At first glance, it may appear disproportionate; but taking account of the damage that it might prevent, it could well be proportionate. Despite the immense power of destruction possessed by nuclear weapons, the principle of damage limitation remains valid and must be kept in mind. Indeed, it was one of the principles that governed NATO’s nuclear planning during the Cold War.
Another principle is legality. All action must be legitimate, properly authorised and in general accordance with customary international law. This is a grave impediment in combating opponents who show not the slightest respect for any law; but acting differently would, in the end, mean applying the law of the jungle and eroding our own credibility. This principle does not, however, rule out the necessary adaptation of existing international law to the changing international environment, since no legal culture – national or international – is ever static. This concerns jus ad bellum, jus in bello and the authorisation to use force.
Finally, the resolve to sustain an action is a fundamental principle of a modern strategy. Whatever instruments are used, there is always a need to see the effort through, until the aim and the objectives are achieved. This requires, first and foremost, the political will to act, the patience and the stamina to see it through, and the manifold resources needed to sustain efforts that may go on for decades. Resolve, however, must never mean obstinacy. The will to see a crisis or a conflict through always requires the flexibility to adapt actions as appropriate, in order to achieve the strategic aim.
At the moment most evidence suggests that Western left-leaning elites have become so enervated and beset with a decadent lassitude that the idea that we can develop "the political will to act, the patience and the stamina to see it through, and the manifold resources needed to sustain efforts that may go on for decades" is more a wishful fantasy than an imminent reality. The implications of this are dramatic and the subject for my next post.
Recent Comments