Yesterday Michael Totten published “Al Qaeda Lost”, an article documenting the turn of events in Ramadi. Lieutenant Colonel Mike Silverman offered some very hopeful perspective on Ramadi from the view point of someone on the ground who has been intimately involved with the area and its people. The article starts with some excerpts from an interview Totten had with Lieutenant Colonel Silverman:
“How long have you been in Ramadi?” I said.
“Since the last week of January, 2007,” he said. “When I first got here my area of operations was the southern half of downtown. It was ugly then, especially for the civilians. We found more than 50 dead in just one grave in the desert. 50,000 – 70,000 people have returned so far since the war ended in April.”
“Describe the progress you’ve seen so far,” I said.
“Sure,” he said, “let’s look at the Abu Bali area for example. 6,000 or so people live there. When I first arrived there were 10 attacks every day just in that small area alone. Since May 1, 2007, we’ve had only one attack total in that area. The people went from having two to three hours of electricity a day to having twelve hours a day. Insurgents kept blowing up the power lines, but now that they’ve been cleared out the government has put them back up. Commerce has really taken off.”
Ramadi is now a stable, peaceful city and the Sunnis there are now important allies of the United States against the terrorists of al Qaeda. If you have not yet done so you should read the entire article.
I was struck by one particular aspect of the description of Ramadi under al Qaeda. Within the article was a fascinating bit of discussion which goes a long way toward answering a question I have had meandering through my mind for quite some time: How many "bad guys" does it take to destroy a civilized society? The answer may surprise you:
“How many fighters were there?” I said.
“Around 150 hard core fighters,” he said.
“What?” I said. “Only 150?”
How could 150 fighters possibly transform a city of 450,000 people into a second Stalingrad?
“I expected you to say there were thousands,” I added.
“It felt like thousands,” he said. “Anyway, I’m only talking about the number of hard core fighters. The 150 doesn’t include the larger number of people planting IEDs. The population couldn’t do anything about these people. They were terribly intimidated. If Americans even handed someone a bag of sugar, his entire family would be killed. There are graves all over Abu Bali. People were taken there, decapitated, and shot in the head.”
He doesn’t really know how many hard-core fighters there were in the city. No one does. I asked Colonel John Charlton the same question – how many were there? – and his answer was very different even as his description of the fighting was identical.
“It looked like Stalingrad a few months ago,” he said. “There were around 750 fighters in the city proper. It could be less. I don’t know, it’s really hard to say. You have to understand, they worked in five- to ten-man cells. And it only takes one guy to fire an RPG or a sniper rifle. They used mosques, schools, and safe houses. We found an auto shop that had been converted into a car bomb factory. Because they had such small cells it was very difficult to go in there and clear them out.”
A constant subtext to the discussion of Iraq and the greater Middle East is the question of the suitability and capability of the Arab and the Muslim to have a functioning democracy. I have found that within many of the self-described liberals I know there resides a deep seated conviction that the Arabs are simply too primitive and uncivilized to ever have democracy and freedom. Certainly many conservatives would agree and very likely, after so much trouble in Iraq, the numbers who would agree are on the increase, yet the numbers mentioned by Lieutenant Colonel Silverman and Colonel John Charlton are quite remarkable in their implications.
Whether we use the smaller or larger number, or even double it to 1500 fighters, the meaning is clear:
Significantly less than one percent of the population was able to destroy civil society and create chaos in a city of almost half a million.
This, too, puts our counter-insurgency efforts into a much clearer light. No one can blame the people of Ramadi for initially treating our military as occupiers; they had been primed for just such a characterization by decades of anti-American propaganda; further, no one should be surprised that they initially welcomed al Qaeda, promoters of their brand of Islam, as liberators. However, once they allowed al Qaeda in the front door, they very quickly learned that fascists with guns are relatively indiscriminate about who they abuse and torture. The contrast with American troops, despite the heavily hyped and propagandized use of abu Graib to tar our military, became clearer by the day, yet to stand against the true oppressors of al Qaeda risked horrible torment and death for oneself and one's family. Al Qaeda may be no match for our Soldiers and Marines but few people are ready and able to stand against the uncivilized men with guns.
It is stunning to think of how few it takes to destroy a functioning society.
It should be a cautionary tale for those who recklessly attack the foundations of our society. Civilization, for all its robust appearance, is neither inevitable nor eternal. It only takes a remarkably few uncivilized men with guns to destroy everything.
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