Readers of my blog will not find it surprising that I think very highly of both Hugh Hewitt and Tom Barnett. They have been engaged in a particularly interesting debate about the War in Iraq.
Tom Barnett insists that we cannot midwife consensual democracy in Iraq and our presence can, at best, slow down the pace of the inevitable ethnic cleansing that must take place before a stable Iraq can emerge. In addition, he assigns a fair amount of blame to the Bush administration for, essentially, their neglect of the realpolitik that he espouses:
Why the killings to follow will all be blamed on Bush
Bush let the Sunni-Shia civil war unfold by waiting too long to surge the necessary numbers.
Bush THEN accelerates a fight with Iran on WMD, despite his intell community's judgment that Iran is 3-5 years away from fielding a bomb.
By doing that, and prepping the American public for military strikes with Iran, Bush not only loses popular support at home (sheer fear over a premature escalation and spreading of the war) but encourages (!!!!) Tehran to push as hard as possible in its proxy war in Iraq, so as to keep us diverted and bleed our troops. THAT Bush decision kills ours troops unnecessarily.
THAT Bush decision also encourages (!!!) Riyadh to counter in Iraq with its own effort. That effort also unnecessarily leads to American troop deaths.
Finally, Bush refuses any serious diplomatic surge to accompany the troop surge, and that means he's led America into a strategic cul-de-sac: we either preside over slo-mo ethnic cleansing, losing troops unnecessarily along the way, or we watch it go faster from the sidelines. Either way, our credibility in the region plummets. If we lose enough Americans in this idiotic pathway of Bush's stubborn creation, he'll singlehandedly kill American popular support for a long-term presence in the region. Those deaths that follow will also sit on Bush's head.
Hugh Hewitt has fundamental differences with Tom Barnett and his conclusions flow from a contrary set of assumptions and expectations:
I believe there are excellent prospects for stability in Iraq, and I base that assessment on everything coming out of Iraq as well as interviews such as the one I conducted with Major General Simmons this morning which will play on the program today as well as on interviews with General Petraeus, John Burns, Michael O'Hanlon, General Keane, Fred Kagan, Max Boot and Bill Kristol (each of the six civilians have been in Iraq in the recent months.) I don't think the bloodletting that Dr. Barnett views as inevitable is in any real sense "inevitable," and those urging it --both Democrats and Republicans-- are playing with genocide as though that's just a consequence of the world in which we live. When Dr. Barnett admitted to there being at least a "small chance" of avoiding the sectarian slaughter he predicts will follow our withdrawal from the middle of the Sunni-Shia conflict in Iraq, he gives up the argument about morality. There's a lot of evidence that there is a great deal more than "some chance" of that happening, but even "some chance" of reducing loss of life and helping Iraq emerge as a stable democracy compels us to stay committed to the freely elected government of Iraq.
I also find it unpersuasive --indeed very unrealistic-- to assert against a great deal of evidence to the contrary that we can negotiate with the Iranians, and urge Kim Kagan's comprehensive report on Iranian interference on everyone who believes we are missing an opening with Iran.
I agree completely with Tom's basic premise that Globalization and increased connectivity will eventually be the death knell of Radical Islam. The bloodthirsty and intolerant version of Islam supported by the fundamentalist interpretation of the Koran is incompatible with the modern world and incompatible with liberal democratic policies that form the structural underpinnings of the modern world. However, we still have the small problem of finding the least painful and disruptive way to get from here to there, and I think Hugh Hewitt has the much more powerful argument.
(An aside: Please note, in re: the discussions of Moderate Islam we have been having here recently, that it doesn't matter if Islam is inherently intolerant and bloodthirsty or if the Islamists merely represent one form of Islam; in the end, fundamentalist Islam is incompatible with modernity.)
(A further aside: Coincidentally, Moqtada al-Sadr's effective surrender suggests that the blood letting may yet become manageable and ethnic cleansing not inevitable.)
The blogosphere's premier Jacksonian, at Dumb Looks Still Free, whose posts always reward the requisite time and mental energy invested in them, makes some telling points that raise serious questions about Tom Barnett's conclusions. In his look at the interview between Hugh Hewitt and Thomas P.M. Barnett he is especially sensitive to the effect of yet another betrayal on the Kurds, who have one of the truly functional states in the Middle East run by Muslims. He also wonders where non-state actors, major players in the 21st century, fit into Tom Barnett's schema. Further, he wonders about the effect on us if/when we once again abandon our commitment to Liberty, Freedom, and Democracy:
When fighting to remove a tyrant the responsibility is to help those that have suffered under such despotic rule to stand up on their own, work out their differences, defend themselves and find a way to government that will not easily repress them again. A government accountable to other Nations and to its people. To run from that to 'get the killing over with' will mean we will have run from those ideals and tyranny will prosper in our absence because we are unwilling to support it. And once that happens abroad, it will come here because we have proven incapable of sustaining the gift handed to us and understanding its importance.
It is, of course, impossible to know the outcome in advance of any particular approach to our problems in Iraq. Tom Barnett may well be correct that Iraq can only become stable after sufficient blood has been spilled and with the assistance of Iran, Saudi Arabia, et al. I find Hugh Hewitt and Jacksonian's arguments more persuasive but all make supportable arguments. I would like to suggest that there are additional factors that must be part of the equation.
Tom Barnett's arguments rests on his belief that ultimately, nation states behave in ways consistent with a rational assessment of their self interest and that by recognizing, and harnessing, such self-interest, we can achieve the stability necessary for reducing violence to acceptable levels. His approach specifically emphasizes mobilizing Iran and Saudi Arabia to help stabilize Iraq. It is an article of faith among the realists that Iran seeks stability on their borders and fears chaos. I think this faith is misplaced for two reasons.
Shia Islam celebrates martyrdom and awaits and invites the Apocalypse; further, the form of Shia that President Ahmadinejad follows believes that fomenting chaos and the Apocalypse will hasten the return of the 12th Imam and lead to a Utopian Caliphate being established on Earth. Their belief system allows them to contemplate sending hundreds of thousands of children clasping plastic keys to clear mine fields with their bodies. This is not a rational belief system.
Worse, the irrational belief system of Shia Islam intersects with the equally dangerous belief structure of the Malignant Narcissists who control Iran. When the rulers of a nation can not distinguish between themselves and their state (ie, the Malignant Narcissist sees his followers and his populations as essentially objects which support the leader's grandiose sense of himself), they are unable to conceive of the state existing without them. Such a leader will risk the absolute destruction of his state in an effort to protect himself. Furthermore, when all hope is lost, they have no qualms about raining destruction upon any and all; after all, without them in it, the world has no worth to such an extreme narcissist.
The idea that Iran will undergo regime change and/or evolve into a more normal state which can be addressed with the usual diplomatic niceties is potentially quite dangerous. If, in fact, I am correct and the realists are wrong, the greatest danger of Iran obtaining nuclear weapons is that when the Mullahs inevitably begin to lose control of their country and their hold on power, the temptation to precipitate the Apocalypse will become insurmountable.
Much as I would wish that Tom Barnett's prescriptions would work for the Middle East, I fear that these unfortunate realities are being inadequately addressed by those who counsel retreat.
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