Iran is never far from the thoughts of people who are concerned about the future. It remains the state sponsor of some of the most effective terrorist groups in the world and has been threatening to destroy both the Great Satan (America) and the Little Satan (Israel) since the theocratic revolution of 1979.
There are some who propose that we tolerate Iran gaining nuclear capabilities; they suggest containment worked during the last cold war and would work just as well with Iran. Unfortunately, the people most in need of reassurance that such an outcome would be tolerable are behaving in ways which suggest that such reassurances are unlikely to be persuasive. The Sunni Arab states in the Gulf have been on a shopping spree, grabbing up an assortment of military weaponry to direct against their Persian Shia foes. Furthermore, such stable and responsible nations as Turkey, Saudi Arabia, and Egypt have all made loud noises about revving up their own nuclear programs (and lower volume noises about gaining access to the already extant Sunni bomb in Pakistan.) Not to mention Israel, which tends to react with some anxiety to genocidal threats.
There remains a window of opportunity for the world to avoid the worst possible future scenarios. Iran does not yet have a bomb and their technical stumbles offer some reason for believing that their ability to actually master the Uranium enrichment cycle is still questionable. At the same time, past examples of nations surprising the West with their unexpected progress toward the bomb (India, Pakistan, Libya, Iraq in 1991) give reason for concern and raise serious questions about how much time we have to work with.
As readers here know, I am a fan of Tom Barnett and believe he is absolutely onto something important when he suggest that the most crucial strategic goal for America should be to enlarge the core and shrink the gap. Tom believes that the recent signs that the conservative Mullahs are reigning in Ahmadinejad suggest they may be more willing to deal than we credit them. He believes a deal is possible:
I think a variety of deals are possible, but short of some treaty-like guarantee on non-attack, I expect Iran to hold strong on the nuke program in such a way that they end up with a Japanese-like latent capacity to go short-term on development of weaponry. We get them to go no further than that (meaning they would still own their own fuel) for the right package, and a decent detente-like process for the region (tempering Iran's ties with both Saudi Arabia and Israel) would be in the offing.
A Jacksonian provides an argument that contradicts Tom Barnett’s notion. AJ always writes long, but very carefully reasoned posts, and this one is no different. In Why not containment for Iran?, he suggests that any notion of a deal rests on the assumption that Iran’s leaders are rational, in the conventional Western sense of the word. Further, he presents a quite plausible scenario under which an Iranian bomb can be used to further their trans-national goals:
Iran does not need to use a nuclear device *externally* for it to win, in their eyes. They are not rational nor conduct a traditional Nation State. Thus, to them, ALL options are open. Which includes killing off a portion of its population to bring the entire nation into line. They are NOT rational, and containment only works on those that are rational and see death as a problem for themselves. This is not the case with the Iranian leadership. And thinking so will only come back and bite you hard, very hard, in the long run.
I wish that they were rational, but we must deal with the fact that they are not. Nor are they amenable to a system of Nations that does not suit their needs. But they *do* understand the concept of a 'two-fer' just fine. Kill lots of their own people, blame the West, see the West undergo massive confusion, join up hard with Transnational Terrorists and strike the final blows against the entire Nation State concept so that Islam can take over.
Irrational to *us* but not to *them*.
And it just *might* work.
The entire post is well worth reading, if only to appreciate how AJ builds his argument.
The criticism of AJ’s warning has traditionally been based on the belief that the Iranians are actually rational actors and understandable by the West: Those who believe in the 12th Imam are a radical fringe, even within Iranian Shiism. We can deal with the Iranian moderates, buy time, and wait for the core to overtake the Iranian gap.
I am afraid that my understanding of the psychology of the Iranian Mullahs tends to be much more supportive of AJ’s conclusions than of Tom Barnett’s. I obviously hope I am wrong, because I doubt that in the current climate there is any will to prevent the Iranians from achieving their nuclear goals, but if I am correct, grim times lie ahead. The Iranian Mullahs who actually run the country exhibit many of the characteristics of a Malignant Narcissism wedded with an Apocalyptic religious orientation that creates a pronounced suicidal propensity.
The Malignant Narcissist sees other people as mere role players in the drama of their conception; this is a common characteristic of most despots, and is certainly true of the variety of Islamic fascists we are dealing with around the world today.
Thus, to the Mullahs, Jews and Americans are indeed the major obstacles to the victory of Islam, infidels who exist only to be destroyed. All must submit to their particular view of Islam and the caliphate must be restored. Recall that these are the very people who used children as young as 7 and 8, holding plastic keys to heaven, to clear mine fields during the Iraq-Iran war. Further, the Shia religious tradition in Iran has always sanctified self sacrifice (see Ashura) and martyrdom. The Iranians have bragged that they have signed up 40,000 suicide bombers to use against us if we attack them. In addition, Persian Shia believe that the 12th Imam will emerge from his hiding place and bring the Utopia of the Caliphate after the chaos of the apocalypse has begun. The more extreme believe that by precipitating the apocalypse, they will create the conditions in which his emergence is assured. To this end, the Iranian regime has broadened and repaved the road leading from the well in which he has been in occultation for a thousand years, in preparation for his re-emergence. All of this does not, of course, prove that the Iranians cannot be dealt with, but is does suggest a problem for Tom Barnett’s strategy that needs to be addressed.
If we assume that the Iranian moderates are in control and willing to make the kind of deal Tom suggest, attaining the ability to enrich Uranium (the hard part) without actually constructing a bomb, time is not on the Mullah’s side. The more that Iran is opened up to the core, the more restive the population will become. The Iranian oil industry is already functioning poorly and there is little chance that even if the climate changes in the next few months, any significant improvements can be made in less than 2 or 3 years, at minimum. The Iranians desperately need foreign investment but their own requirements have even discouraged the Chinese and Russians from investing, so change in this area is going to come very slowly, independent of their return to the good graces of the international community.
What happens when the Iranian Mullah’s grip on power begins to slip, as is implied in Tom Barnett’s scenarios, is the major question that any deal makers must address. If you believe that the Mullahs are analogous to the Russian communists, this is a viable approach. You would believe that while there may be a small number of true believers in their ideology, most are more pragmatic and primarily interested in this world. In such a case, the transition to a post-mullahcracy world could be managed without disastrous consequences.
Unfortunately, the difference between the true believers in Communism and the true believers in Shia Islam are significant and crucial. The Communists believed that their approach would lead to a material Utopia on Earth. By the 1970s, most recognized that as an economic approach, it was unlikely to ever succeed at achieving its goals. At that point it was a rather simple matter to loosen the ideological blinders and seek the next best thing for the Malignant Narcissist, power and money. Vladimir Putin is the classic example of a true believer who has adjusted his sights to the current realities of life in Russia.
The Mullahs are a different story. Their focus has always been on the will of Allah and their place in the next world; their disagreements have always tended to involve different interpretations of what Allah wants. They know he wants Islam to rule all and they know he will reward any martyrs with paradise; they disagree on how best to restore the caliphate, by waiting for the 12th Imam or creating conditions to invite him. Westerners who treat religion as merely opinion have trouble with the idea that these people actually believe what they say they believe, yet the logic suggests that if their grip on power begins to loosen, there will be a sizable cohort who believe that their entire world view depends on the 12th Imam's appearance, at which point, all bets are off.
I suppose the question I would address to Tom Barnett and those who want to engage with the Iranians would be twofold:
If we make a deal which cements the Mullah’s hold on power, and their ideology essentially involves enlarging the gap, how does this help make anyone more secure and lessen the risk of catastrophe?
Recognizing the malign confluence of Malignant Narcissism and Millennialist Religiosity, are there any assurances or reasons to believe that the Mullah’s goals can be shaped or changed in a positive direction by their possession of the bomb?
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