In Part III, Owen addresses the vital questions about the role of Islam in this war. This is a long post, as are the previous two, but deserves careful attention. As such, it is perhaps apt that we have a long weekend in which to consider the implications of our approach to Islamic terror.
On Islam, War, and Paradox
"For many centuries, Muslims had been accustomed to a view of history in which they were the bearers of God’s truth with the sacred duty of bringing it to the rest of mankind. The Islamic community to which they belonged was the embodiment of God’s purpose on Earth. The Islamic sovereigns who ruled over them were the heirs of the Prophet and the custodians of the of the message he had brought from God, with the God-given duty of maintaining and applying the Holy Law and extending the area in which it prevailed. To this process there were in principle no limits."
That quote from Bernard Lewis (The Middle East, Chap. 16, pg. 305) aptly sums up the cornerstone principle of the argument for general conflict between Islam and us. For Muslims, it provides the religious, moral, and legal justification to conquer and subjugate non-believers who resist the will of God. For us, that principle, when combined with the aspects of Islamic culture we find deplorable, leads many to the conclusion that Islam is a fundamentally dysfunctional culture, inexorably drawn to extremism and bent on our destruction. To accept this view is to conclude one of two things:
- That Islam itself is the enemy, not just radical elements within it, and a general war with Islam is inevitable; or
- That while Islam itself is not the enemy, it is inimical to democracy, and its inherent dysfunctionalities will always create violent radical elements that will continue to attack us unless it can be reformed.
In the first view, Islam itself must be defeated, in a conflict that will be prolonged, violent, and bloody. In the second view, the Jihadis must be defeated or at least contained, and Islam itself reformed. If Islamic democracy is not seen as viable, the alternative would seem to be a largely self-imposed Islamic reformation that does not depend on the successful introduction of democracy. Such reform would represent the triumph of moderate Muslims over the extremists, delegitimizing the latter and allowing the moderates to control (if not expunge) their violent tendencies.
If the first view is correct, our current strategy is not only wrong but dangerously shortsighted. It fails to do any more than address the symptoms and may actually encourage the enemy’s efforts. If the second view is correct and our belief in the transformative power of democracy is indeed misplaced, our experiments in nation building and promoting democracy are doomed to fail. Under these circumstances, Islamic radicalism would sustain itself and continue to breed violence, and the specter of Jihadis armed with WMD becomes increasingly real.
Just as worrisome, the aftermath of our failures could recapitulate the bloody dislocation that followed on the failure of "imperialist" meddling in the Middle East in the early years of the last century, but this time with much more powerful weapons. While likely to be different in character than a general war with Islam, it is perhaps an equally undesirable result.
So on our side, the strategic options to avoid a larger, potentially global war come down to democratizing Islam or reforming it. If neither of these is possible, the question of war is almost entirely out of our hands.
Let us look then at the other side; the Jihadis. They certainly agitate for war: the Wahhabis and their adherents {the Sunni side of the Jihadis) in have explicitly said they are at war with us, and have announced their intention to restore the Caliphate. Their emphasis on the international nature of this conflict and their widespread international activities, particularly in Europe, make clear that they do not consider their aims as limited to the Middle East. Radical Shi`a, based in Iran, at least contemplates a return hegemony over the Middle East and the religious domination of Islam. They may also foresee an apocalyptic showdown with the forces of the Great Satan, but they have been somewhat less consistent about this.
Both the Wahhabis and the Shi`ites are minority sects in Islam. They are less separated by doctrine than by over a thousand years of mutual animosity. The Shi`ites in particular have a sense of martyrdom and persecution that has deeply affected their religious and political attitudes and behavior. Their ultimate aims would thus seem to be diametrically opposed, but at this time, we stand in the way of both of them. As such, what is required for them to fulfill their apocalyptic aspirations?
Apocalypse Now … or Later?
From a historical perspective, war between us and Islam has been more the rule than the exception, so the notion that another major war is looming is not an extraordinary one. But history also demonstrates that high degree of Islamic unity is a necessary condition to succeed in such a conflict. When Islam has been lead by a Caliph, a Sultan, or an Emperor of sufficient authority, it has advanced. When such rulers have been absent, weak, or had to face rivals of similar stature, Islam has retreated.
Such rulers have always embodied an important religious as well as social and political dimension. Caliphs were explicitly the religious leaders of Islam, as well as rulers, and were maintained in that role as figureheads even after their executive power was eclipsed by the Sultans. Eventually the Sultans appropriated the religious role too, and after the last Caliph was over thrown by the Mongols, the Sultans did not see any need to later resuscitate the office. Sultans, in their role of "defender of the faithful", engaged in a number of campaigns of conquest and conversion against Europe, capturing Greece and much of the eastern Europe.
The Ottomans raised Islam to the height of its power, but the decline of the Empire beginning in the sixteenth century, and especially the failure of the second siege of Vienna in 1683, badly shook Islam’s confidence in it’s own superiority. The initial response of the Ottoman court was to reform its military on the European model. Although the Emperors intended to limit this reform strictly to the military, it lead to more far-reaching reforms and by the mid-1700s, the Ottoman Empire had acquired a distinct European taint that compromised the religious authority of the Emperors. By the late 1700s, it was apparent that there was no longer an Islamic authority that, even in principle, could mobilize the Faithful to support a war against the Infidel.
The Ottoman Empire continued to become involved in wars with Islamic rivals like Iran, and in European Wars where it role was determined by geo-political, not religious, concerns. By the time of its collapse, the Ottoman Empire was so far removed from its nominal role as the leader of Islam and, by virtue of its extensive adoption of European modes, from the core of Islam itself, that Mustafa Kemal (Attaturk) succeeded in establishing a secular republic in its place.
Yet throughout this period of decline, and ever since, no comparable Islamic authority has arisen and attempts to establish unity by other means have not met with success. In the late 19th Century, the idea of pan-Islamism originated as means to unify all Muslims against the threat of Christianity, but it was quickly appropriated by the Ottomans who made a limited form of it official policy to prop up their flagging prestige. As such it was of some use to the emperor in appealing to his subjects for loyalty against dissident elements and gaining the support of other Muslims outside the empire, especially those in Europe. But overall it seems never have become a major factor, being eclipsed by other imported ideologies and by the idea of nationalism.
Pan-Islamism probably did help inspire the Pan-Arab movement which espoused unification among the Arab peoples and nations of the Middle East based on Arab nationalism. Pan-Arabism was the most serious attempt to establish unity among Muslims on non-religious grounds. Its most successful champion was probably Egyptian leader Gamal Abdel Nasser, and the Ba’ath Party in Iraq and Syria supported it as well, but military defeat by Israel and the failure of pan-Arabist governments, who had strong Marxist leanings, to produce economic growth effectively ended the movement as a serious force for Muslim or even Arab unity. (Pan-Arabism does still exert considerable influence among Arab intellectuals, I believe in a manner analogous to Marxism among US academics.)
Part of the problem with pan-Arabism was in fact its secular and nationalist nature, which flew in the face of the Islamic egalitarianism and the ideal of unity among believers. Seen as discriminating against non-Arab Muslims, pan-Arabism failed to gain enough traction outside of intellectual circles to compensate for its failures. The fact that the end of pan-Arabism as a serious force coincides with the rise of radical Islamist ideologies is probably not a coincidence. Eventually even such a dedicated pan-Arabist as Saddam Hussein had to adopt a much more Islamic stance to maintain his prestige in the Muslim world.
The trans-national character of the Jihadi movement is significant in that it represents the skeleton of a authority that might compel a greater portion of Islam to support a war with us, as in times past. (Such a war may not be one of conquest per se, but of subjugation: the Vichyization of the West. In practical terms the distinction hardly matters.) However, the skeleton has remained just that despite the careful nurturing of decades, and as such the Jihadis, even with state support, have been unable to exert the influence necessary to achieve their designs.
Furthermore, they are subject to opposing tensions. The stateless nature of the Sunni Jihadis works in their favor in being congruent with Islamic ideals, but those ideals are in tension with national and sectarian loyalties. The Shi`a Jihadis have the opposite problem: their creed has a more ethnic and nationalist tenor which enhances identity and group unity but that tends to be in opposition with Islamic ideals and may alienate non-Iranians.
So the Jihadis themselves have something of a problem. To inaugurate the war they seek with us, they need to muster much more active support than they have, and also do something about the competing tensions, both between their groups and greater Islam and between each other.
Do they have a plan to deal with this problem, or — if that question is too doctrinaire, and it probably is — how does this situation bear on what the Jihadis are seeking to accomplish today?
Jihadi War Aims - Killing Peter to impress Paul
One of the Sunni Jihadis’ stated goals, frequently mentioned with a degree of derision, is to restore the Caliphate. This claim conjures up for us visions of an seventh-century ideological movement attempting to turn back the clock and elicits many pejorative comments in that same vein. But it also misunderstands the basic premise that underlies their goal.
The Jihadis do not understand their fundamentalism in the sense of reverting to a seventh-century society; it is doubtful that they intend to restore legal concubinage or slavery, or excise Western influence to the point of depriving themselves of cell phones or the technology to exploit their oil resources. Like Christian fundamentalists, their focus is on capturing what they hold to be a truer essence of their religion, going back to first principles, as it were. For the Jihadis this means in large part rekindling a sense of dedication to the sacred duty of bringing Islam to the rest of mankind while it defending from attack by whatever means necessary.
The Jihadis understand their history quite well and recognize the vital role of a religious unifier in their success. The last such unifiers who in their view had the proper credentials are the Arab Caliphs. Later Sunni Islamic rulers were mostly Turks, and while the Turks were quite successful and represent the pinnacle of Islam achievement, the deep cultural antipathy between Turks and Arabs explains why the Jihadis do not hold up the Ottomans as a proper historical inspiration.
Thus, the Jihadis’ desire to restore the Caliphate does not imply a return to some bygone semi-mythical social ideal, but return of Islamic authority with the credibility to create an Islamic unity with sufficient power to challenge us. This in turn explains the Jihadis methods and tactics, which brings us to the paradox.
The Paradox - the Circle is Squared
Up to this point, my discussion skirts a paradox that underlies much of our public discussion of the war, and it is time to address it. The paradox is this: the Jihadis employ terrorism as their tactic of choice. Terrorism is the weapon of the weak. Conventional terrorism may cause us pain but cannot threaten our civilization. Even nuclear terrorism is unlikely, as terrible as it is, to result in our collapse. Yet we say that the Jihadis present an existential threat.
How can this be? Either Islam presents an existential threat and we are fighting the wrong sort of war, or this really is a law-enforcement problem and we’re still fighting the wrong sort of war. What is the resolution to the paradox? How can this particular circle be squared?
It can be squared because the paradox is based on a misunderstanding of what the Jihadis are trying to accomplish at this stage in the conflict. The key is that they are not yet fighting to destroy us — they are fighting for control of Islam. The terrorist campaign is designed to force our retreat, not defeat; to show our weakness and lack of fitness to hold our paramount position in the world. The 9/11 attack, following up earlier attacks, was intended to be a master stroke that, after two decades of demonstrated vacillation and weakness — in Iran, in Lebanon, in Somalia, in Bosnia, Rwanda, Kosovo, and Palestine — would render our decline irreversible. Muslims throughout the world would take note and embrace the movement that had inflicted these blows and demonstrated our basic unfitness. With us in retreat and themselves ascendant, the restoration of the Caliphate, in the sense of described above, would be inevitable. And with the restoration of that authority, they believe their victory would be assured.
The Vital Corollary
The vital corollary is this: the Jihadis are not yet in a position to impose the degree of unity they need for their victory. Their master stroke energized us and moved us to action, calling into question their basic assertions about our strength. They continue fight us using terrorist means because they lack sufficient support in the Islamic world to fight us any other way. This means that the Jihadis are not as dangerously close to the mainstream of Islamic society as many seem to think. They have yet to prove themselves and so can be isolated, and being isolated, defeated. That is exactly what our strategy intends: to destroy not only the Jihadis and their resources, but to destroy their credibility as potential leaders of Islam as well.
The Vital Caveat
The vital caveat is this: Iran’s pursuit of nuclear weapons is more than just a desire to get the means to wipe out Israel. Nuclear weapons confer instant credibility. If we allow the Mullahs to achieve them, it represents not only a serious threat, but a severe symbolic defeat for us as well. In essence, the Mullahs are trying to achieve through the acquisition of nukes what they has so far been unable to achieve through terrorism. This benefit accrues to them — in principle — even if they have no intention of ever using nuclear weapons. The same might be said — again in principle — for idea that nukes will give them an "instant hegemony" over the Middle East.
I emphasize "in principle" because acquiring nukes is a gamble for them, not just with us and Israel, but with the Islamic world as well. It is not clear that Iran’s Sunni neighbors are prepared to accept a nuclear-armed Iran, in which case rather than enhancing the Mullah’s Islamic prestige, this may be a "bomb too far." The resulting prospect of nuclear one-upmanship in the Middle East is frightening indeed. All the more reason (as if more were needed) for us to do everything in our power to see that the Mullahs do not succeed in their nuclear aspirations.
Now, with this understanding of Jihadis war aims, we are brought back to the question: what are our options and what are the chances of successfully implementing them?
Our Response - Weighed and found wanting?
At the beginning of this section, I stated that our strategic options to avoid a larger, potentially global war come down to democratizing Islam or reforming it, because only such measures can destroy the Jihadis’ credibility as potential leaders of Islam and remove the societal support on which they depend. Our counter-terrorism, military, and diplomatic efforts must support one or the other of these options or our strategy becomes in effect just a holding action, with no clear victory in view.
In order to examine these options more fully, it is time to explore the approaches we might use for each and try to assess how realistic they are. But first I want to emphasize that my purpose here is not the set up rhetorical straw men to demolish in pursuit of a preconceived result. In discussing these options it is important realize we are discussing a constellation of activities under each approach, and that each approach offers, and generally requires, flexibility. A simple example is that we are supporting democracy in Iraq and an autocrat in Pakistan while largely ignoring another autocrat in Libya — all at the same time and under the same strategy. So when I talk about our different approaches to implementing our strategic options it will be well to bear this example in mind.
That said, I think we can reduce our approaches to three alternatives without oversimplifying too badly. I will term them: Passive Containment, Active Containment, and Engagement. The first two support Islamic reform; the third, Islamic democratization. (Again, by reform, I mean reform that does not depend on the successful introduction of democracy but a triumph of moderate Islam that results in their ability to control the extremist factions and deny support to the Jihadis.)
In the Part IV of this exegesis, to be posted on Monday, Owen describes the three alternatives in further detail and offers his conclusions about our progress toward victory in this war.
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