In 1998 Efraim Halevy became the Director of the Mossad, the Israeli Intelligence agency, widely credited as being one of the most effective such services in the world. He had been involved with the Mossad from 1961 rising to the level of deputy chief, until he left the agency in October 1995, a week before the assassination of Yitzhak Rabin, a man he admired greatly. He spent three years as Israel's ambassador to the EU and was hastily recalled in 1998 to take over as Director of the Mossad after a series of public disasters left the agency in crisis. He recounts various stories from his years in the Mossad and his intimate involvement with many of the most significant events of the last 40 years in the Middle East in his book, Man in the Shadows.
While Halevy's writing tends to be dry and occasionally stilted, his impressions of the dramatis personae int he region are priceless and he sheds light on some of the most critical events of the times.
However, I do not mean this post to be a book review. I was struck by something he discusses that occurred to him when he was so precipitously recalled to lead the Mossad in 1998. The difference between being a deputy director and the Director was much greater than he realized and the limitations of intelligence were frightening. This has significance for our current difficulties in Iraq, in the more global war on Islamic fascism, and on the current fighting between Israel and the Syrian/Iranian proxies Hammas and Hezbollah.
Halevy points out that during the Cold War, the warring parties established various levels of dialog (political, military, commercial, academic, media) and rules that governed their interactions.
The situation to which Halevy returned to the Mossad in 1998 was different in significant and fundamental ways:
The circumstances surrounding the principal issues of the late nineties were entirely different. The sole means of access to the principal players were, and to some extent still are, those of intelligence gathering and penetration. The terrorist cells of the various groups practicing international Islamic terror shunned contacts with the outside world except by way of their terrorist operations and the publicity they wished to attract to them. Diplomatic, commercial, or academic channels to these groups were never created, and as a result of this, almost absolute reliance was place don the intelligence net. Similarly, the countries attempting to develop nonconventional weaponry limited access to them to a bare minimum. Of the famous "axis of evil" declared by President George W. Bush after he assumed office, Iraq and North Korea were for all intents and purposes pariah states existing almost entirely in a state of isolation, whereas Iran, which did allow and maintain diversified conduits tot eh world at large, clearly monitored and controlled them.
Thus, as the free world was propelled into what may someday be seen as the greatest of its tests in living history - its encounter with two deadly menaces to its very existence - the means whereby it was able accurately to gather the vital data it required to assess the dangers were restricted as never before. The difficulties involved in gathering reliable information were colossal. The time span normally applicable to this type of task had to be extended in order to produce results, but the lead time for foiling the evil intent of the enemy was becoming shorter. (p. 179)
Thus were the intelligence chiefs in the major countries of the free world catapulted into roles that they had never performed before and for which they were initially ill equipped. Just as they were instructed to gather the vital data without delay, so were they drawn into policy roles or into partnership with policy levels because these policy levels were so thin on their own capacities and capabilities. (p. 180)
In this rather dry telling, Halevy makes the point that none of the Western Intelligence Services (including the CIA, MI6, Mossad) had the institutional experience, the assets in place, or the policy experience to deal with the emerging threats from Islamic terrorists and terror states working to acquire WMD. Furthermore, the political classes were increasingly reliant on the Intelligence agencies to guide their actions. This was the very-nearly blind leading the blind, at a time of increasing danger to all.
The matter-of-fact way in which Halevy writes makes this all the more chilling and puts a different slant on the failures of American intelligence prior to 9/11 and the invasion of Iraq. As well, it informs our understanding of the current Israeli offensive against Hezbollah. The single most ominous event since the start of hostilities was not the act of war committed by Hezbollah or Hamas in attacking a sovereign nation and taking prisoners; nor is it the ongoing war crimes committed by Hezbollah and Hamas, neither of whom disguise their intent to annihilate Israel and kill as many Jews as they can. No, the single most ominous sign was the fact that not only did Hezbollah hit the Israeli Navy ship, but that they did it with a weapon that Israel apparently did not know they had. Further, the constant threatening noises from Hezbollah (that the worst is yet to come and that Tel Aviv is next) cannot be reassuring to Israel that continued restraint is the wise course. As per OP FOR, Israel is almost certainly Prepping the Battlespace. Any other explanation would call Israel's intelligence, as well as their Intelligence, into doubt.
Donald Rumsfeld was caricatured by many when he made his inelegant, but absolutely accurate, comment that it is the unknown unknowns that are most dangerous. When the head of the Mossad admits how limited his information is about his next door neighbors, this truly ratchets up the risk for anycountry which is a target of fanatics who proclaim their desire to destroy them.
And one other note: the "disproportionate" meme is an insult to our intelligence. I do not think it is worth discussing. It should be obvious that the best way to deter a bully is to use overwhelming force so that he will never again be tempted to provoke you. Anything less than that is simply an invitation for further troubles down the road. I would suggest reading A Difficult Lesson for some clarity on this issue and then going to the Gates of Vienna where the Baron has the last word on the subject of A Matter of Proportion.
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