Scientists use the scientific method to construct carefully measured and controlled experiments in order to minimize any conscious or unconscious bias they may have. Because they recognize that they often have an emotional stake in the outcome, the method includes constructing a "null hypothesis" and using statistical methodology to determine the likelihood of any particular outcome being the result of random chance. When positive results are reported, they are reported as to their level of confidence. A 95% level of confidence means that you could expect the particular result to arise by chance 5% of the time, 1 out of 20 experiments; a 99% level of confidence means that only one time out of a hundred could you expect the outcome from chance alone. Results that come in at less than 95% are not considered significant in a scientific paper, even if there are clear trends and the data is highly suggestive. Additionally, scientific findings are not accepted as legitimate until they have been replicated by others. Even when the scientific data begins to accumulate supporting a new theory, there will be hold outs who refuse to accept the new, hard won "fact" as a fact for a very long time. The more strongly one is invested in the old, now discredited theory, the more difficult it will be for a person to change their mind and accept the new idea.
As an example, in 1989 Martin Fleischmann and Stanley Pons at the University of Utah made the front pages of newspapers around the world with their reports that they had created a process of cold fusion, which if confirmed would have revolutionized energy production. Unfortunately, many attempts to replicate their findings failed to show evidence of the process occurring and eventually alternative explanations for the findings were presented as more credible than the original claims. Cold fusion fell into disrepute and has remained there ever since. This is how science works when it works well. There are still people looking at the question of cold fusion, but they are typically pursuing the grail with different methods and without major government funding.
Unfortunately, we do not have the luxury of such experimental designs or replicability by independent sources in most human interactions, including political disputes.
A patient from many years ago (notice that all the patients I talk about are from many years ago; this is to maintain confidentiality with people I have seen more recently or continue to see) illustrates how a similar process, of slowly accretion data which eventually becomes so powerful that a new hypothesis is accepted, can work in the quasi-scientific laboratory of the Psychoanalytic situation. When this young woman, the youngest of three siblings, came to see me she described a rather horrendous childhood which included her father exiting the family when she was only 5. Her mother became overtly promiscuous, bringing home different men on a regular basis; the men would be seen by the children for a day or two and then disappear. One day, after two or three years of this, one of the men stayed. He moved in and within short order had begun to be verbally and physically abusive to the patients mother and her siblings. He then began to abuse her older sister and brother, however, she had no recollection of any abuse of herself and was quite confident she had never been abused by him. When we started she was in a long term relationship with a man who was mildly sadistic to her, but she tolerated his moods and his nasty comments because he loved her. After several months of treatment, she matter of factly mentioned that she didn't like sex or see what was so great about it. Further exploration revealed she most often was "not in the mood" for sex, yet when her boyfriend insisted, she would passively submit. In response to a question about what would go through her mind at those times, she answered "nothing", her mind was a blank. When she reported dreams they often included exquisite details of her childhood home, the tiles on the bathroom floor, the square of sunlight on the rug in her parent's room, as well as images that suggested damage to her bodily sense of integrity (a constellation often seen in adults who have histories of childhood abuse). Between her history and her suggestive symptoms (along with many other details I am leaving out in the interest of brevity and confidentiality), I made the not particularly surprising hypothesis that she had, in fact, been sexually abused, like her siblings, as a child, but had repressed the memory in order to protect herself from the severe trauma of abuse. As I was aware of my own Confirmation Bias in this area, I looked for evidence that would support her conscious contention that no abuse had taken place; further, I did not immediately share with my patient my hypothesis for fear that it would either be summarily rejected or would begin to affect the flow of her thoughts in ways that would cloud the issue.
Over the course of several months, it became quite clear to both the patient and myself that she experienced her boyfriend as insensitive and more than occasionally abusive. He liked "rough" sex which she found degrading and invasive. An addition emerged in one of her memories of her step-father, as usual not at all connected to her current situation. He was always telling her he "loved (her) the most" which was one reason she was so convinced he had never abused her. BY this time I was pointing out that some of the things she was saying about her boyfriend were quite similar to things she had said about her step-father; she didn't see the similarity.
One morning she came in with a disturbing dream. In the dream she discovered her boyfriend was cheating on her with her best friend and she confronted him about it. He responded that he "loved (her) the most" and then raped her.
When she relayed the dream to me, I merely said, "isn't that what your step-father would say to you?"
She dissolved into tears. When she finally caught her breath, she asked me how long I had known he had abused her and how she could have possibly kept the memories hidden. A flood of memories followed int he next several weeks and she kicked out her boyfriend shortly thereafter. Years later she said to me that she had just seen one of those pictures that show different images depending on whether or not you are focused on the figure or the ground. You could stare at the image for days without seeing the alternate image that people insist was there until suddenly you see it, and then wonder how you could have ever not seen it.
It seems to me that we are now at the point where the figure and ground may be in flux on one of the most contentious issues raised in the war in Iraq, the existence of stockpiles of WMD. Eli Lake at The New York Sun (by subscription only, unfortunately) has written about the revelations about WMD that came out on Wednesday. In his article yesterday, Poison Gas Shells Prompt Calls For WMD Search, he pointed out the major importance of this find is that it suggest the Duelfer reports finding can not be considered definitive:
The latest information about the chemical weapons shells, however, is most damaging to those who suggest the work of former weapons inspectors David Kay and Charles Duelfer have provided the definitive word on the whereabouts of the suspected WMD, according to the chairman of the House Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence.
"Duelfer after 18 months was not able to find this stuff," Mr. Hoekstra said. "We made this determination that hundreds [of weapons] were found. I think this is a significant quantity. What does this say about all of the other issues that continue to be raised [such as] stuff transported to Syria. I don't believe everything that is out there is credible, but it shows how much we still don't know."
In his article today, Pentagon Fears Old Iraq WMD May Be Used he adds some additional information:
The details of where and when the loose ordnance was found have yet to be declassified. But two former intelligence community officials said the Iraqi military left numerous chemical weapons shells in the field of battle at the close of the Iran-Iraq war in 1988.
Even before the American-led invasion of Iraq, the U.N. weapons inspection team led by Hans Blix raised concerns about the whereabouts of the chemical weapons that Iraq used against Iran. "A residue of uncertainty also remains with respect to chemical munitions that were lost, according to Iraq, after the 1991 Gulf war," a U.N. Monitoring, Verification, and Inspection Commission report from May 30 says. "The Iraq Survey Group quoted conflicting statements of former Iraqi officials, one individual suggesting that some 500 155-mm munitions were retained by Iraq and other officials, insisting that they were actually destroyed."
That report, to be included in a forthcoming survey of Iraq's unconventional weapons program, also says some of the chemical shells were likely mixed in with conventional weapons: "Moreover, some chemical munitions filled with chemical warfare agents were marked as standard conventional weapons, which made their identification as chemical munitions problematic, not only for United Nations inspectors and later personnel of the Iraq Survey Group, but also for Iraq."
The potency of the shells varies, but according to the U.N. report, some of the 1980s-era chemical weapons would be lethal even after nearly 20 years.
Additionally, Lake was on the John Batchelor show last night and suggested there is a great deal of internal conflict at the Department of Defense, as well as at the CIA, over releasing more data. He reports that his sources tell him there is much more in the still classified portions of the report which would be disruptive to current narratives. Old Spook has a particularly interesting look at the Back Story:
The story begins in April of this year, when a team of intelligence analysts, assigned to the Army's National Ground Intelligence Center (NGIC) published an exhaustive report on the continued recovery of chemical weapons in Iraq. Their report clearly noted that the weapons were clearly manufactured before the first Gulf War. However, the NGIC analysts also observed that some of the weapons remained in good condition (suggesting an Iraqi effort to preserve them), [Emphasis mine-SW] and posed a potential threat to coalition forces, if they fell into the hands of insurgents. From what I'm told, the report contained a full listing of all chemical weapons discovered in Iraq since the fall of Saddam, cut-away diagrams of the weapons, locations where they were found, and their potential lethality if employed by terrorists.
His conclusion:
Kudos to the NGIC team for publishing this discovery, and to the members of Congress--Santorum, Hoekstra (and Pennsylvania Congressman Curt Weldon)--who pushed for its public release. Our elected officials should demand answers on why this important data never made its way up the chain of command, and why their requests for information were apparently stone-walled by the Pentagon and the intel community.
There are many intriguing unanswered questions about the "missing" Iraqi WMD and the burden of proof clearly rests on those who believe that the stockpiles existed prior to the US invasion of Iraq. However, those who profess certainty that no WMD existed in Iraq prior to the invasion and that Saddam destroyed all of his WMD while hiding this fact form the West, the UN, and his own Generals, might be well advised to re-consider the intensity of their certainty.
The New York Times makes the case that those who continue to look for evidence of Iraqi WMDs are at least minimally of questionable psychological integrity. In For Diehards, Search for Iraq's W.M.D. Isn't Over Scott Shane includes these comments:
The final report of the group, by Charles A. Duelfer, special adviser on Iraqi weapons to the C.I.A., concluded that any stockpiles had been destroyed long before the war and that transfers to Syria were "unlikely."
"We did not visit every inch of Iraq," Mr. Duelfer said in an interview. "That would have been impossible. We did not check every rumor that came along."
But he said important officials in Mr. Hussein's government, with every incentive to win favor with the Americans by exposing stockpiles, convinced him that the weapons were gone.
Mr. Duelfer said he remained open to new evidence.
The Times also helpfully includes a summary of the talking points used to minimize the recently declassified report of 500 munitions in Officials Discuss Report on Munitions:
Intelligence officials who briefed reporters on Thursday and who were granted anonymity provided these details of the findings:
¶All the chemical weapons found to date were manufactured before the 1991 gulf war and have been found in "small numbers" in various places.
¶The munitions are "generally in poor condition" and "are not in condition to be used as designed."
¶Nonetheless, the projectiles contain chemicals that could be dangerous or even lethal to small numbers of people if incorporated in an improvised explosive device or released by other means.
¶Insurgents have publicly expressed the desire to use chemical weapons and could conceivably acquire such aged shells on the black market.
The officials said military and intelligence agencies had no evidence of unconventional weapons produced in Iraq after 1991 or of stockpiles of chemical and biological weapons that President Bush and other top administration officials cited as a potential threat in justifying the invasion in 2003.
Interestingly enough, the anonymous sources do not include Secretary of Defense Rumsfeld, who last night said that the military was very concerned about such weapons and the danger they pose to our forces and innocent Iraqis. Allow me to anticipate the objection that Rumsfeld has an obvious personal interest in the outcome by pointing out that the very same thing could well be true of the anonymous sources.
With all of this as preamble, I have a question for those who continue to be convinced that those of us who believe there are unanswered questions and a fair amount of uncertainty have developed psychological pathology:
What number of munitions, in what condition, would meet your threshold of non-deniability? If 500 munitions, some unknown number apparently in very good shape, does not reach your threshold, would 1000? 5000? 10,000?
It would be very helpful to know what your degree of confidence is and what data would be required to cause you to re-assess your certainty that Saddam Husein had no WMD and had destroyed all of his admitted past stockpiles.
It would save us all a lot of time and energy if and when more data comes to light.
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