"The Future is hard to predict because it hasn't happened yet."
In one of my first posts, on Homeostasis and Conservatism, I explained that biology and psychology are basically conservative. The body and the mind attempt to maintain homeostasis, essentially a dynamic equilibrium that ranges within certain relatively well defined limits. As a result of our conservative predisposition, we tend to have difficulty recognizing when our environment has shifted so dramatically as to require a paradigm shift in our thinking. We tend to expect current conditions to continue indefinitely and rarely see the "black swans" until their effects are unmistakable and painful. We did not pay attention to Islamic radicalism until 9/11. Worries about the sub-prime markets were in evidence months before the bubble began to burst yet even among our most sophisticated investors, few were prescient enough to protect themselves. Tsunami warning systems are cheap, yet the nations of the Indian Ocean rim did not set up such systems until the Christmas tsunami devastated Aceh. The list could go on. All of these events were unexpected, "black swans", yet all were, in retrospect, predictable.
We are currently in the midst of a paradigm shift. The international order is failing in significant ways as a result of globalization and its discontents. Our current institutions have done a poor job of dealing with the shifts. For example, the Supreme Court decision to offer habeas rights to enemy combatants addresses an issue that is intimately connected to our enemy's strategy in their asymmetric war against us yet fails to appreciate how the courts have validated the enemy's approach and given them additional ammunition to use against us. Dealing with the empowerment of non-state actors will require creative thinking that has not yet been in evidence within our political discourse though has been abundant within our military, whose lives depend upon seeing the "black swans" before it is too late.
Monday morning a new monograph, From the New Middle Ages to a New Dark Age: The Decline of the State and U.S. Strategy, by Dr. Phil Williams, became available at the Strategic Studies Institute of the US Army War College. The monograph is an attempt to describe some of the implications of the weakening of the Westphalian system and suggest some efforts that could be made to prepare for the worst and either prevent or ameliorate the worst case scenarios. The monograph is well worth reading in depth.
The connectivity that is part and parcel of globalization has many salutary effects. For example, globalization has created tremendous wealth throughout the world, with the newly developing nations (China, India, Brazil et Al) developing a growing middle class. Proponents of globalization typically focus on the benefits of the increased connectivity and minimize the dangers that are inherent in a more connected world. Tom Barnett describes this in terms of the core and the gap, with the primary concern strategically moving forward to enlarge the core and shrink the gap. On the other side of the discussion, John Robb consistently focuses on the dangers that arise from globalization, with the increased risks and consequences of disruptive tactics by super-empowered groups (Al Qaeda) and individuals. Despite their differences both Tom Barnett and John Robb would agree that one consequence of the changes taking place on a massive scale around the world is the weakening of the Westphalian state system.
Dr. Williams describes the New Middle Ages in which we are living:
(pp. ix) Security and stability in the 21st century have little to do with traditional power politics, military conflict between states, and issues of grand strategy. Instead, they revolve around governance, public safety, inequality, urbanization, violent nonstate actors, and the disruptive consequences of globalization. This monograph seeks to explore the implications of these issues for the future U.S. role in the world, as well as for its military posture and strategy.
Underlying the change from traditional geopolitics to security as a governance issue is the long-term decline of the state. Despite state resilience, this trend could prove unstoppable. If so, it will be essential to replace dominant state-centric perceptions and assessments (what the author terms “stateocentrism”) with alternative judgments acknowledging the reduced role and diminished effectiveness of states. This alternative assessment has been articulated most effectively in the notion of the New Middle Ages in which the state is only one of many actors, and the forces of disorder loom large. The concept of the New Middle Ages is discussed in Section II, which suggests that global politics are now characterized by fragmented political authority, overlapping jurisdictions, no-go zones, identity politics, and contested property rights.
Failure to manage the forces of global disorder, however, could lead to something even more forbidding—a New Dark Age. Accordingly, Section III identifies and elucidates key developments that are not only feeding into the long-term decline of the state but seem likely to create a major crisis of governance that could tip into the chaos of a New Dark Age.
Not surprisingly, Section III is of the greatest interest to me. It is extraordinarily difficult for someone growing up in the West to appreciate that our civilized society, with functional governments and adequate governance, is a historical rarity in much of the world. It is even more difficult for those coming of age in a stable, democratic society, to recognize that such a society is an inherently unstable structure; democracy attempts to manage instability (ie change) by establishing a dynamic equilibrium that ranges within prescribed limits.
(The Republicans failed in the last several years when they attempted to move beyond tolerable limits; this may be why despite our built-in checks and balances, politically divided government often seems like a safer alternative than a single party controlling the Congress and Presidency.)
"Black swan" events are destabilizing by their nature and have the potential to disrupt even the most stable democracies. The breakdown of the state system and the growth and development of large groups who do not have their primary allegiance to the state is a danger that few countenance.
I have noted on many occasions that even the healthiest and most sophisticated society can regress under stress. Societal regression tends to intensify two superficially opposing tendencies. Societal regression favors a devolution of power and authority from the central government to more local sub-units, ie tribes. Iraq after the invasion and deposing of Saddam Hussein regressed to a state of tribal allegiances and inter-tribal and intra-tribal conflict. At the same time, such regression can strengthen the state's push to enlarge its authority in traumatic situations and this is often at the cost of jettisoning democratic consensus. Hitler took advantage of societal regression in post-war Germany to offer himself as a savior for German pride and prosperity and did away with democratic niceties along the way. (Keep in mind that the German regression strengthened the tribe that was coincident with the state. Non-members were attacked and scape-goated; in nations with larger minorities, inter-tribal conflict strengthens the local tribe at the expense of the state.)
Dr. Williams describes the various contributors to the decline in state authority and some of the outcomes of state abdication of its responsibilities:
His conclusion and warning is chilling:
Each of the drivers outlined above poses a formidable set of challenges to the state. The drivers also feed off one another in ways that are not only mutually reinforcing but multiply the difficulties in developing an adequate response. In complexity terms, they interact in an emergent system which makes the ultimate outcomes both synergistic and highly unpredictable. The extent to which states are able (or unable) to adapt and learn also adds to the uncertainties. Nevertheless, it is not hard to envisage the transformation of global politics and an abrupt, nonlinear shift from the New Middle Ages to the New Dark Age. [Emphasis mine-SW]
Dr. Williams takes Tom Barnett to task for an overly optimistic assessment of the conditions that he describes. It is certainly true that Dr. Williams is taking a particularly pessimistic view of the possibilities, however, it seems to me wise to follow th old adage of "prepare for the worst and hope or the best."
Tomorrow I will discuss some of the possible pathways that could cause such a "nonlinear shift" and what can be done about the dangers ahead.
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