On Fairness and Passion

Civilizations fall when they have been hollowed out from the inside, when their elites no longer consider their civilization of any value and as a result allow others to control their security and their future.  For Western, Judeo-Cristian Civilization, the Jew (and now Israel), has traditionally been the "canary in the coal mine", presaging the various storms that have struck the West in the past.  Once again, Israel and the Jew is at the center of a non-quantifiable, highly conflicted, strategic and psychological struggle being played out in the world.

Yesterday Josef Joffe, writing at MESH (Middle East Strategy at Harvard) took issue with the core idea behind Samuel Huntington’s Clash of Civilizations:

Clashing civilizations revisited

Ideological conflicts will be superseded by civilizational ones. This is the key idea in Samuel Huntington’s Clash of Civilizations. I did not share this idea then, and I do not believe in it today.

For civilizational clashes to become virulent, a core state within a particular culture must turn into its avant-garde—that is, drape itself in the civilizational mantle to magnify its power in the pursuit of classic state interests. This introduces a potent qualifier that drastically limits the universe of clashes. Two examples: Russia resurgent uses energy, not Orthodoxy as “force multiplier.” China does not use “Sinism” to expand its influence; it is doing quite well with its sheer size and mass, with its monetary reserves and its vast market. In the past, European would-be hegemons like Charles V might have invoked Catholicism, but as we know, Habsburg had no compunctions to conspire with the Ottoman Porte against France, or France with Sweden against the “Holy Roman Empire.”

So how far does the theory carry? There is only one contemporary case that fits the bill: Islam, which clashes with the West abroad (e.g., through Hezbollah vs. Israel) and within (homegrown terrorism in Britain, Holland, or Spain). But there is yet another qualifier. It is not Islam as such, though its realm is shot through with seething rage against the West. Saudi Arabia, Jordan, Egypt, the “Gulfies” are allies of the United States, and not only in name, because that bond serves their security interests. Turkey, though turning away from secular Kemalism, remains a member of NATO and wants to join the European Union. True, its fealty to the United States is declining, the most dramatic instance being its denial of a northern invasion route to the U.S. in the 2003 Iraq war. But it is not at all clear that this decision had Islamic roots. It is better explained in terms of state interest, such as not letting the U.S. operate freely in a neighborhood where Turkey has fish to fry against PKK extremists.

So it is hard to pin the clash on Islam as such.

Agree or disagree with the importance of Islam within the mix of factors involved in Muslim antipathy to the West, his article raises some important points and ends with a crucial, clarifying question:

As modernization unfolds, so has multiculturalism with its relativism and anti-Western bias, especially in the Western academy. Today, we are less confident that secularization is the way the world goes. Nonetheless, what is almost an aside in Huntington’s Clash, raises the most fascinating questions for the future. What is the relationship between religion, culture and modernity? As they say in the academy: “More research and funds are needed.” In this case, the need, though self-serving, is blatantly obvious. [Emphasis mine-SW]

There is no doubt that our current civilization emerged from a matrix which included religious belief as a bedrock component.  Prior to the discovery/invention of the Jewish G-d of Abraham, the Universe was a capricious place whose workings depended solely on the whim of the Gods.  An argument can be made that our modern world depends on the development of the idea of a universe designed by G-d according to predictable laws that man could approximate, if not fully comprehend.  Science could only be invented by those who believed that the world could be understood by man.  A related argument can be made that Islam has failed to facilitate modernity precisely because of its core belief that man can never understand the world but must instead submit to it.

As Western sophisticated man has increasingly marginalized G-d, replacing Him with the image in the mirror, we have almost imperceptibly lost touch with the rootstock from which Western Civilization emerged and grew. 

On January 2 of this new year, Rabbi Daniel Gordis reflected on a religious work he had studied in his childhood and wondered about its application today:  [HT: Robert Avrech]

This particular Mishnah, quite appropriate to the tenor of our times, is about how you divide things up when they are contested:

If two people are holding on to a tallit [a Jewish prayer shawl-SW], this one saying, “I found it,” and that one saying “I found it,” this one saying “it’s all mine,” and that one saying “it’s all mine,” [then] this one takes an oath that he has a share of no less than half, and this one takes an oath that he has a share of no less than half, and they divide it [equally].

[But] if this one says “it’s all mine” and that one says “half of it is mine,” [then] the one who says “it’s all mine” takes an oath that he has a share of no less than three quarters, and the one who says “half of it is mine” takes an oath that he has a share of no less than one quarter. This one then takes three quarters, and that one gets one quarter.

I must not have been a terribly insightful seventh grader, because it took me a really long time (much longer than I’ll admit in this setting) to realize that the tallit didn’t necessarily have to mean a ritual garment, but that it could be anything. With time, thankfully, I figured that out. Even back then, though, it was clear that the Mishnah was seeking fairness. If two people each claimed the whole thing, then the equitable thing to do was to divide it up evenly. But if one claimed it all, and one claimed only half, dividing it equally would be to give no credence to the claim of the one who claimed everything. So then, it was split 3:1. Seems fair, doesn’t it?

Fairness seems to be what Israel’s leaders believe will settle the Mid-East conflict. One land, claimed by two peoples. Kind of sounds like the Mishnah, they apparently believe. So the fair, equitable thing to do is to split it.

The Rabbi goes on to discuss a meeting with a group of young Israelis.  He asks them about their plans; none of them consider joining the army to defend the state of Israel.  He then asks what should be a simple question:

So I push the kids. Annapolis was just over, and the “Jewish State thing” was still brewing. “Why do we need this State in the first place?” I asked them. No answers. “Well,” I pushed, “what have people said about that question when you’ve discussed it in school?” Still silence. “No one’s ever asked me that question before,” one of them admits. The others nod their heads.

“Really?” I ask, trying to conceal my amazement. You go to the very best religious schools, you’re almost done with high school, and no one – not at any point – has ever raised the question of why the Jews need a State? They all shake their heads. Never.

Rabbi Gordis muses about the contrast between the Palestinians who love their land and do not question their right to the entire state of Palestine, and the Israeli youngsters and their benighted leaders who love fairness and seemingly fail to understand the need to even ask the question, let alone answer it.  I take issue with Rabbi Gordis that the genesis of the Palestinian hatred of a Jewish state is the outcome of love for the land.  Rather I would suggest that the enmity that Palestinians express toward Israel has to do with passion, fueled more by envy and rage than love. 

However, the more interesting point at the moment is the contrast between the Palestinians passionate certainty that it is all theirs and the Israeli's defensive, muted certainty that fairness should suffice.  The secular Israelis have retained their religiously derived, culturally supported, and quintessential notions of fairness, while losing the passion that derives from belief.

Watch a group of preschool age children.  We work hard to get them to accept the notion of fairness, that a child should share even though he is bigger and stronger.  Few children of that age are passionate about fairness; few voluntarily will share their cookies.  Without an adult to supervise, there will always be one who will take what he wants; if his avarice is sanctioned, he will grow passionate about his right to have what he wants.  In such a setting, the civilized child who only wants to share will have no chance.  You will search long and hard to find a group of children who passionately desire to share their toys with those less fortunate than them.  Inculcating such fairness is a long and dififcult task achieved late in the development of the child; many never develop the notion as an internalized precept.

Civilization depends on tempering our passions.  Yet it also depends on a passionate belief that we have something special and worthwhile, that we deserve what is ours, and that we are willing to fight to defend it.  Passion without the leavening of religious belief too often devolves to hedonism, the elevation of the self and its immediate gratifications above our better ethical and moral nature.  By abandoning their religion, Israel's leaders have given up the connection to the land they stand upon.  It is merely real estate.  Realtors just need to make a sale; they have no chance against those who so passionately love or desire the land that they are willing to kill obtaining it or die defending it.   

I do not know where the threshold is, but once the number of Israelis who passionately love their country falls below that threshold, Israel will be finished.   It is certainly true that for a particular individual religious belief is not a prerequisite for love of country, but for a population, such belief may well be determinative.