The Conventional Wisdom, as expressed by various members of the MSM, Congressmen, Senators, the occasional artiste, and the odd pundit or two, has it that the Iraq War has been a costly mistake, a disaster that we are losing; in short, in the words of that most traditional of the CW purveyors, Don Imus, "a mess." It is rarely established by what metric the War is a disaster, though there seems to be a heavy reliance on "body counts" and usually unsubstantiated reports from various stringers that support the meme of the day.
One of the virtues that the 60s generation had (and they didn't have many, I fear) was a determination to "question authority." Admittedly, this was often carried to an extreme, and all authority figures were rather indiscriminately held in contempt (though, in an interesting bit of confused idealization, those authority figures who sanctioned the questioning of authority figures rarely tolerated being questioned themselves). However, while rarely remarked upon these days, the fact is that the rebels of the 1960s have now become the establishment authority figures of the 2000s, and it is worth questioning their authority.
(The doyens of academia, the MSM, especially the gray lady of the media, Eurocrats, UNophiles, the entrenched vestiges of the 60s in the Democratic party, are all as establishment as it gets.)
I would suggest that not only are we not losing in Iraq, but we are winning the war; however, we can still quite easily snatch defeat from the jaws of victory.
I base my assessment on a number of factors, primarily strategic issues relating to the War on Islamic fascism and our current status in the larger war.
The War against Islamic terror has always been multi-pronged, with multiple fronts, and against several major, often shifting, political axes. To distill as much as possible, it is easiest to think of our enemies as shifting coalitions of convenience between primarily Sunni Islamists (al Qaeda, an Egyptian and Saudi offspring), Sunni Secularists (Iraqi and Syrian Baathists), and Shia Islamists (Iran, Hezbollah). The Sunnis have been the Middle East's riling class since the time of the British; the Shia have been making their impact felt since the time of the Iranian Revolution. All three groupings represent significant dangers to the region and to the United States, and any response to Islamic terror requires addressing all three major strains. I would suggest we have to a great extent defeated the Sunni secularists and have devastated the Sunni Islamists; both could yet make a return if we allow it but for now they are more nuisance than clear and present danger.
Before assailing me that everyone, including the Iraq Study Group "know" that Iraq is a disaster, I think it would be helpful to explain what I see as the strategic factors at work. Last week, I suggested The Iraq Study Group is Studying the Wrong War. At this point, Iraq as a threat has been defeated. Since Iraq was the leading secular Sunni fomenter of terror, we have effectively removed the threat from the board. At the same time, by creating the threat of democracy in the heart of the Middle East, the Sunni Islamists, who saw themselves as equally at risk as the secularists, became engaged in the insurgency. According to al Qaeda's own words, they have been decimated, with upwards of 7000 dead, including many of their most experienced and effective leaders. Osama bin Laden and Ayman al-Zawahiri are left hiding in caves and issuing the occasional grainy video for their fans. They have likely shifted their locus to the wilds of Pakistan (another front in the war and one which is quite problematic, but cannot be addressed adequately at this time.)
With the relative marginalization of al Qaeda in the region, our attention would, in any rational world, turn to the major supporter of Islamic terror, Iran. The possibility of an American attack on Iran has decreased because of the failure to pacify Iraq. However, most of those who oppose the Iraq War have always been most supportive of containment as a strategy. I would suggest that in order to contain Iran, it is helpful to have > 100,000 troops next door in Iraq and Afghanistan.
The goals of the war at t his point have become twofold:
1) We need to stabilize Iraq and do a better job than we have been in bringing some order to the country.
2) We need to contain Iran and find a more stable, though still dynamic, state which discourages them from precipitating a broader war.
To these ends, there are a couple of interesting recent developments. The idea of an Iraqi oil trust, once again in the news, would be more effective than any other single maneuver in giving the majority of Iraqis a stake in the peace and well-being of their country. Bribing people has a long and honorable tradition in this part of the world and a legal, agreed upon bribe, ie that every Iraqi will gain form Iraq's oil wealth, would be a major boon to the Iraqification of Iraq.
A second development concerns the apparent efforts underway to ease out Nouri al-Maliki as Prime Minister (which by extension downgrades Sadr's influence). Captain Ed has it exactly right:
Maliki needs to go, and go soon. Engaging Sadr doesn't work, and the US should return to our previous policy of targeting him and his Mahdi army lieutenants if they refuse to disarm. Thanks to Maliki, he has infiltrated the Interior ministry, so he will present a difficult opponent if he chooses to fight it out. However, Sadr makes a better power broker than a general, as he has proven several times now. Without Maliki running interference, he will be more exposed than ever.
And guess who has apparently given his blessing to the change? Grand Ayatollah Ali al-Sistani. We have not heard much from the widely respected Shi'ite cleric since Sadr's star rose, but it looks like he's coming out of his de facto retirement from national politics.
The Iraqis have tired of the lack of progress even more than we have. It looks like they have formed a coalition of groups large enough to shut down Maliki and Sadr in the National Assembly, which means that even the Shi'ites have had enough. Keep an eye on this over the next few days.
Yet a third development puts the entire exercise into perspective. Jules Crittenden reports on More Good News:
The Gulf Arabs want nukes. Why is this good news? Nuclear-armed Persian Shiites and Sunni Arabs can stare at each other across the Gulf, a lot like the Indians and Paks stare at each other across the Line of Control. Nuclear-armed Israelis will stare at all of them.
Fly in the ointment: Iraq remains the no mans land. Guerrilla war and terrorism will continue throughout the region, the only option when the alternative is Armageddon. But with the playing field leveled, no fear that the Iranians will become the dominant power in the region.
Some people may be unhappy with all these Muslim bombs around. But that train left the station about 20 years ago. This was inevitable. So, look on the bright side of that mushroom cloud. Maybe they suddenly have to grow up a little. Meanwhile, they keep each other in check.
Of course, Jules does supply an eloquent footnote:
LGF is rightly concerned about corrupt regimes and religious fanaticism. The Gulfies are primarily interested in making money, however, and have been inching toward reforms. People who are interested in making money usually would rather chisel you out of it than blow it all up. The Wahabist threat, in any case, is nicely counterbalanced by the Shiites and the Israelis. The more I think about it, the more I like this three-legged stool. Could solve a lot of problems for us, and maybe even become the key to Mideast peace. Unless ... it all ... goes ... horribly ... wrong.
The upshot is that we have achieved many important goals already in this war at an historically low cost. Please do not tell me that each soldier's death is a tragedy. Everyone knows that and feels it; the death of American soldiers should not be used as a reason to undermine their mission. We are in a better position with the Sunnis terror supporters, secular and Islamist, today than we were in 2001. We are also, importantly, in a much better position with Iran (though it is not clear that we have used our proximity; recent unrest in Iran is suggestive.)
There are still several ways in which the war could go very badly. We could become so convinced we have lost that we will do whatever is necessary to lose. We could follow the ISG's prescriptions (which sound like they were written in Riyadh. One of the great scandals of American foreign policy has been the covert influence of Saudi oil money on our politics. There are innumerable politicians from both parties who have become wealthy since leaving government by working with the Saudis; maybe John Mearsheimer and Stephen Walt could look into this for their next book.) If anyone thinks these ideas are a prescription for winning, consider who supports them.
Imagine an alternate WWII if we had defeated Italy and Japan but Germany's counter-attack, the Battle of the Bulge, was successful. In my alternate history, we are facing the Germans in a stand-off while they feverishly race to develop their nuclear weapon. There is a guerrilla war going on in France and we have lost 3000 American soldiers there between 1945 and 1948. Domestically, the New York Times leads a media campaign to "bring the boys home" and the Republicans successfully sweep the 1948 elections on a platform of retreat back into isolationism. A high ranking committee lead by Charles Lindbergh publishes a report that it is time to consult with Hitler in order to find a way to bring peace to central Europe.
Substitute the Iranian Mullahs for Hitler and that is where we are today.
As a reminder, the Iranian elections, on Friday, will tell us a great deal about whether or not the current fighting is likely to escalate in the near future.
Update: Neo-neocon is on a similar wavelength today, trying to define "success" in Iraq.
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